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Abstract
A unique indivisible commodity with an unknown common value is owned by
group of individuals and should be allocated to one of them while compensating the
others monetarily. We study the so-called fair division game (Güth, Ivanova-Stenzel,
Königstein, and Strobel (2002, 2005)) theoretically and experimentally for the com-
mon value case and compare our results to the corresponding common value auction.
Whereas symmetric risk neutral Nash equilibria are rather similar for both games,
behavior diﬀers strikingly. Implementing auctions and fair division games in the lab
in a repeated setting under ﬁrst- and second-price rule, we ﬁnd that overall behavior is
much more dispersed for the fair division games than for the auctions. Winners’ proﬁt
margins and shading rates are on average slightly lower for the fair division game.
Moreover, we ﬁnd that behavior in the fair division game separates into extreme over-
and underbidding.
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Auctions and fair division games are used to allocate indivisible goods among a group of
bidders. Whereas in an auction this indivisible good is owned by an external party and
bidders seek to buy it from that party, in a fair division game the good is collectively owned
by the group ex ante. Each bidder has the same legal right to get the good, therefore if
one bidder gets acceptance, the price she pays is equally shared among the bidders. Fair
division games are usually used in conﬂict settlements, e.g. in case of inheritance, divorce,
or the dissolution of a joint venture, where the owner after the bidding has to compensate
the others. We study the special case of common values, where the inherited object, the
formerly mutually owned possessions within the marriage or the joint venture shares, have
the same value to all bidders ex post, which is unknown when the bidding takes place.
Instead each bidder has private information on what the future value might be.
Previous experimental studies on auctions with common values have shown that actual
behavior diﬀers substantially from what theory predicts. Winning bidders systematically
overbid the (unknown) true value of the item and end up earning negative payoﬀs. This
phenomenon, also referred to as the ’winner’s curse’, occurs as winning bidders ignore the
fact that their private information on the true value is an overestimation, conditional on
the event of winning. In order to account for this adverse selection problem they should
place a bid lower than their signal. The winners’ curse phenomenon has been studied
extensively in the lab. It is especially distinct with inexperienced bidders, but barely
vanishes with experience either. Moreover, it is pervasive under ﬁrst- and second-price
rule. Theory predicts a decrease in bids when the number of bidders bidding for the same
object increases for both price rules. Contrary to this prediction an increased number of
bidders leads to more aggressive bidding under ﬁrst-price rule, whereas there is no change in
bidding behavior under second-price rule. These experimental results have been conﬁrmed
in a number of ﬁeld studies. Oil companies claim that they fell prey to the winner’s curse
in early OCS lease sales (Capen, Clapp, and Campell, 1971; Lorenz and Dougherty, 1983).
Similar claims have been made e.g. in auctions for book publications (Dessauer, 1981),
professional baseball’s free agency markets (Cassing and Douglas, 1980) and recently in
auctioning oﬀ the rights for the Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) in
Europe (van Damme, 2002).
Fair division games have so far only been studied with private values. Güth, Ivanova-
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auctions and fair division games, and analyse to what extent learning is inﬂuenced by the
structural diﬀerences between the two games. They ﬁnd for both games that learning does
not drive bidding towards the benchmark solution.
The present study is the ﬁrst to analyze fair division games in a common value environment
experimentally. We provide the symmetric risk neutral equilibrium strategies and – in order
to allow for the winner’s curse – also the -cursed equilibrium strategies for both ﬁrst- and
second-price fair division games. Based on this theoretical investigation of the fair division
game with common values and independently and identically distributed private signals,
we study experimentally the extent of the winner’s curse and its development over time, in
a repeated game setting with full feedback. In addition, we compare the bidding behavior
between fair division games and auctions.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the symmetric risk
neutral Nash and the  cursed equilibrium strategies of the fair division games and auc-
tions. Section 3 provides the deﬁnition of the winner’s curse and presents our hypotheses.
The experimental design and procedures are described in Section 4. Our experimental
results are presented in Section 5 and Section 6 concludes. The detailed derivation of the
equilibrium strategies of the fair division game is deferred to the appendix.
2 Games and theoretical solutions
This study focuses on sealed bid common value auctions and fair division games in which a
single indivisible object is awarded to the highest among n bidders. The true value of the
object v is not known at the time bids are placed and uniformly distributed on [v;v]. Each
bidder receives a private information signal x about the true value. Four diﬀerent games
are investigated: the ﬁrst- and second-price auction and the ﬁrst- and second-price fair
division game. In the auction setting the highest bidder earns a proﬁt equal to the value of
the object less its price; whereas all other bidders receive zero. In the fair division setting
all bidders have ex ante the same legal rights concerning the object. The highest bidder
therefore earns the value of the item, but has to compensate the losers at the same time.
The highest bidder pays the n-th share of the price to each of the other group members
3
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n times its price.





















if i = w
otherwise;
(2)
where index w denotes the highest bidder and p equals the highest bid under the ﬁrst-price
rule and second-highest bid under the second-price rule.
2.1 Symmetric risk neutral Nash equilibria
First-price and second-price auction
The theoretical solutions for the ﬁrst- and second-price auction with common values are
available in the literature and can be directly adapted (see, e.g., Milgrom and Weber (1982),
Kagel and Levin (2002)).
Common values v are uniformly distributed on [v;v]. The signals xi; for i = 1;:::;n; are
independently and identically distributed on U[v ;v+]. The parameter values v;v and
 are common knowledge. For signals in the region of xi 2 [v+;v ], i.e. without corner
cases, the symmetric risk neutral Nash equilibrium (SRNNE) strategy is given by






[xi   (v + )]g (3)
for the ﬁrst-price auction, and




for the second-price auction.
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ﬁrst-price b(x) = x   15 + 1 ; b(x) = x   105
8 + 2 ;
1 = 6exp(  2
15(x   65)) 2 = 675
152 exp(  8
45(x   65))
second-price b(x) = x   15
2 b(x) = x   45
8 + 3 ;
3 =  8:070  10 34 exp( 8
15x)
Table 1: SRNNE equilibrium strategies
Note: n = 4, v  U[50;150], xi  U[v   15;v + 15], x 2 [65;135]
First-price and second-price fair division game
For the same distribution of the random variables and the same region of signals (xi 2
[v + ;v   ]), we obtain the SRNNE bidding strategy1
bFPF(xi) = xi    +
2
n2 +  (5)





bSPF(xi) = xi    +
2(n + 1)




for the second-price fair division game.2 Table 1 summarizes the SRNNE equilibrium
strategies of these four games for the parameter values employed in the experiment, v =
50;v = 150; = 15 and n = 4 in the region x 2 [65;135]. Figure 1 represents the
solutions graphically. For a given price rule and a given signal the equilibrium bid in the
fair division game is slightly higher than in the corresponding auction. Figure 1 shows
that the nonlinearities at both ends of the range of signals we consider are rather small.
This suggests that the exponential term in the equilibrium bidding functions is negligible
in that region. Consequently we will frequently omit the exponential term in the following
analysis.
1Theoretical solutions for the fair division game are derived in the Appendix. Solutions to a similar
problem are derived in Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1994).
2Note that there is no analytical solution for the constant C0.
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Figure 1: SRNNE bidding functions for the auction and fair division games
Note: n = 4, v  U[50;150], xi  U[v   15;v + 15], x 2 [65;135], FD 1st/2nd: Fair division game
under ﬁrst/second-price rule, Auc 1st/2nd: Auction under ﬁrst/second-price rule
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b
(x) x   15 + 15
2 x   15
2 + 15
2 x   105
8 + 15
2 x   45
8 + 15
2











crit 0.80 0.60 0.55 0.35
bcrit(x) x   9 x   3 x   9 x   3
Table 2: -cursed equilibrium bidding functions, critical ’s and break even bids
Note: n = 4, v = 50;v = 150; = 15, x 2 [65;135], FD 1st/2nd: Fair division game under
ﬁrst/second-price rule, Auc 1st/2nd: Auction under ﬁrst/second-price rule
2.2 -cursed equilibrium
There is no winner’s curse in the symmetric risk neutral Nash equilibrium, because bidders
realize that winning the auction or fair division game means that it is likely that their signal
is an overestimation of the true value and they discount their signals accordingly. However,
as the examples in the introduction show the winner’s curse is a prevalent phenomenon in
both ﬁeld studies and experiments.
Eyster and Rabin (2002, 2005) account for this phenomenon in their -cursed equilib-
rium by assuming that bidders correctly predict the strategies of their opponents and best
respond to these strategies, but that they underestimate the relation between the other
bidders’ strategies and those bidders’ signals. If in the ﬁrst- and second-price auction bid-
ders are fully cursed, i.e.  = 1, they do not see any correlation between the other bidders’
strategies and the true value and act as if in a private value environment. Their expected
value of the item conditional on winning is E(vjxi). If  = 0, bidders are perfectly rational
and their expectation of the true value conditional on winning is E(vjxi;xi  xj ;8j).
Consequently, they play the SRNNE strategies. Eyster and Rabin show that if n > 3 there
exists a crit such that bidders suﬀer the winner’s curse in the -cursed equilibrium when-
ever  > crit. The -cursed equilibrium bidding functions for the ﬁrst- and second-price
fair division game can be obtained in a similar fashion (see Appendix B for the derivation).
Table 2 (line 1) summarizes the -cursed equilibrium bidding functions of all four games.3
3The exponential terms are neglected.
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For our analyses in the remainder of this paper we apply the following deﬁnition of the
winner’s curse:
Deﬁnition 1 The winner of the auction or fair division game suﬀers the winner’s curse
if the true value of the object is less than its price, or (v   p) < 0.
This deﬁnition of the winner’s curse is fairly common for auctions (see, e.g., Bazerman
and Samuelson, 1983). For the fair division game, however, this deﬁnition deserves some
explanation. Assume a ﬁrst-price fair division game with n = 4 bidders where the highest
bidder bids slightly above the true value, bw = v+ and the second-highest bid is suﬃciently
below the true value, bj = v   4. The winner receives v   3
4(v + ) = v 3
4 > 0 for small
. If the highest bidder had bid less than bj = v   4 she loses the game and her payoﬀ
is 1
4(v   4) = v
4   , which is less than her payoﬀ from winning. Thus, she prefers her
winning bid ex post although the price exceeds the true value. This example demonstrates
that the winner’s curse can have less dramatic consequences for the winner in fair division
games than in auctions where the winner’s curse always implies a negative payoﬀ for the
winner and zero payoﬀs for the other bidders.
The reason why the winner’s curse does not necessarily lead to negative expected total
proﬁts in the fair division game is that Deﬁnition 1 is based on the proﬁt margin, v   p,
and not total proﬁts, which are given by the proﬁt margin times the share of the object that
switches ownership plus initial endowment. Thus, in the fair division game total proﬁts of
a winner are given by (v p)n 1
n + 1
nv while in auctions the winner’s total proﬁts are equal
to the proﬁt margin.
Table 2 (line 2) provides the expected proﬁt margin implied by the -cursed equilibrium
strategies. Since the bidding strategies depend on the degree of cursedness the expected
proﬁt margin is a function of : The third line in Table 2 shows the critical level of
cursedness, crit; for which the expected equilibrium price equals the expected true value,
and that therefore renders the expected proﬁt margin, E(v   p); equal to zero. For the
ﬁrst-price auction bidders have to be considerably cursed to fall prey to the winner’s curse,
8
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In the second-price fair division game moderate degrees of cursedness are enough for the
winner’s curse to arise. The last line of Table 2 shows the bidding functions that result
from the corresponding critical levels of cursedness. For the ﬁrst-price auction this is the
same expression as the “break even" bid that was introduced in Kagel and Levin (2002)
to refer to the bidding strategy in a ﬁrst-price auction that makes the bidder indiﬀerent
between winning and losing the auction. Therefore, we will refer to the strategies in the
last line of Table 2 as break even bids.
Based on the deﬁnition of the winner’s curse and the predictions of the -cursed equilibrium
summarized in Table 2 we formulate the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 Since the winner’s curse has less dramatic eﬀects on payoﬀs in fair division
games than in auctions there are more occurrences of the winner’s curse in fair division
games than in auctions.
Previous experiments show that the winner’s curse is less frequent with experienced bid-
ders (see, e.g., Kagel and Richard (2001)). Eyster and Rabin (2005) estimate the level
of cursedness for inexperienced and experienced subjects and ﬁnd that  decreases with
experience. While it is unlikely that the experimental subjects will eventually be fully
rational, i.e.  = 0, experience might lead subjects to avoid expected negative proﬁt mar-
gins. We therefore use the break even bids as a benchmark ultimately achieved by the
learning process. Since crit is smaller for both fair division games than for the auctions,
subjects will learn to avoid the winner’s curse quicker for the auctions than for the fair
division games. We derive the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 Time and experience will aﬀect the shading rates and proﬁt margins posi-
tively for all games and price rules.
Even though it has been shown that the winner’s curse is a prevalent phenomenon in auc-
tion experiments the SRRNE benchmark solution should give a tendency on how behavior
diﬀers between auctions and fair division games. Both games are structurally similar, how-
ever they diﬀer in one important aspect: also losers earn something in the fair division
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above the theoretically optimal bid for the auctions for both price rules. Thus, we derive
the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3 For each price rule shading rates are lower in the fair division game than
in the auction.
The central diﬀerence between auctions and fair division games is that in the former the
object to be auctioned oﬀ is owned by the auctioneer while in the latter the group of
bidders collectively owns the object. Therefore, in fair division games the winner has to
compensate the other bidders and not a third party. Thus, in contrast to auctions, in fair
division games the losing bidders beneﬁt from the winner’s curse. A bidder who realizes
that other participants are subject to the winner’s curse can respond by submitting very
uncompetitive bids, hoping to receive an excessive price for her share of the object. As a
result we might have two groups: one group whose bidders compete heavily for the object
and thereby fall prey to the winner’s curse and another group that intentionally loses the
game in order to exploit the other group’s excessive bidding. In order to formalize this we
deﬁne the number of excess wins of a subject as the number of times she actually won the
object minus how often she had the highest signal, i.e. how often she should have won the
game. A high positive number of excess wins indicates that a subject has bid aggressively
while a low negative number suggests that a subject has intentionally lost some of the
games. Therefore, we derive our last hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4 The distribution of the number of excess wins is more dispersed in fair
division games than in auctions.
4 Experimental design and procedures
In our experiment subjects bid in groups of n = 4: The true values were randomly drawn
from the interval v 2 [50;150] and the private signals from the interval xi 2 [v 15;v+15].
Subjects were asked to place a single bid bi 2 [0;200] in each round. All values are denoted
10
Jena Economic Research Papers 2009 - 090Treatm. period 1-20 period 21-40 no. of subjects
1 FD 1st FD 2nd 28
2 FD 2nd FD 1st 28
3 Auc 1st Auc 2nd 32
4 Auc 2nd Auc 1st 32
Table 3: Experimental design
Note: FD 1st/2nd: Fair division game under ﬁrst/second-price rule, Auc 1st/2nd: Auction under
ﬁrst/second-price rule
in a ﬁctitious currency ECU (Experimental Currency Unit). In order to keep monetary
incentives in both games approximately constant we varied the exchange rate (100 ECU
= 14 Euro in the Auction, 100 ECU = 1 Euro in the fair division game).4 We conducted
4 sessions, 2 with fair division games and 2 with auctions. In each session each subject
played 40 rounds, 20 rounds under ﬁrst-price rule and 20 rounds under second-price rule.
We reversed the order of the price rules for the same game to check for order eﬀects.
Bidding groups were rematched after each round within ﬁxed matching groups5. See Table
3 for a summary of the experimental design.
Subjects took part in only one of the sessions, therefore either played the auction or the fair
division game. In the invitation to this experiment they were informed that it would be
possible to make losses during the experiment. When entering the laboratory the possibility
of losses was announced once more, together with the information that a loss would not be
charged in monetary terms but in form of a simple task that the regarding subjects would
have to perform after the experiment. The length of this task would depend on how much
loss they made.6 Furthermore, subjects were told that it would still be possible to leave,
in case they do not agree. However, only one out of 121 subjects did so.
4Güth et al. (2002, 2005) face the same problem of unequal incentives for both games. Due to the
lack of previous data on fair division games with common values we accommodated our adjustment of the
exchange rate to theirs of private values.
5In the auctions we had four matching groups of 8 subjects and in the fair division games two matching
groups of 8 and one of 12 subjects.
6The task consisted of searching for the letter ’a’ in a document produced by a random words generator.
This was however only revealed to the subjects that were actually concerned.
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of the Max-Planck-Institute of Economics in Jena using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). We
recruited 120 undergraduate students from various ﬁelds such as economics, biology, law
and informatics from Jena University, using the ORSEE software (Greiner, 2004). Af-
ter reading aloud the instructions (see Appendix A) several control questions had to be
solved to make sure that the participants understood the game. The experiment lasted for
approximately 2 hours.
5 Results
Consistent with the theoretical discussion in Section 2, we will throughout the analysis only
consider bids that are based on signals within the inner region of v, i.e. x 2 [v + ;v   ].
Signals outside of this region were not per se excluded from the experiment, however they
contain additional information regarding the true value which possibly change the bidding
behavior for those signals.
Table 4 presents a general picture of the data. It provides mean shading rates, optimal
shading rates, signal overbidding, winners’ proﬁt margins, and the degree of cursedness
that explains the winner’s bidding behavior in equilibrium.7 The shading rate measures
the amount that the bid falls short of the signal relative to a measure of the dispersion
of signals. Formally, the shading rate is deﬁned by x b
 : Equilibrium shading rates, i.e.
(x   b(x))=, with b(x) as the SRNNE bidding function, are around 0.85 for the ﬁrst-
price fair division game, 0.375 for the second-price fair division game and a bit higher
for the auction with around 0.95 for the ﬁrst-price auction and 0.5 for the second-price
auction. Proﬁt margins are calculated as the diﬀerence between the true value and the
price, although this means for the fair division game that even if proﬁt margins are negative
the winner may still receive a positive payoﬀ. The degree of cursedness is calculated by
the equation actual = =1 + (1   )=0.
7Due to our matching structure, averages are calculated per matching group. Since we had 4 constant
matching groups for the auction treatments and 3 matching groups for the fair division games, the data
points in the following graphs represent averages over at least 8 individuals.
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behavior. Results from a Mann-Whitney U-test on group means of shading rates support
an order eﬀect for both games, except the ﬁrst-price auctions (FD1st (p=0.2), FD2nd
(p=1), Auc1st (p=0.05714), Auc2nd (p=0.4857)). However, we decided not to pool the
data and to present the results for all games and price rule separately. For each game and
price rules we have two columns, one for experienced and one for inexperienced bidders,
where experience means that the subjects have played the same game under a diﬀerent
price rule before.
13





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Jena Economic Research Papers 2009 - 090Considering all bidders we ﬁnd that for all games and price rules average shading rates are
below their equilibrium predictions. Looking at winners and losers separately provides a
more detailed picture. In both games losers bid relatively close to the optimum, whereas
winners’ bids lie dramatically below the optimal discount rate. The diﬀerence between
winners’ and losers’ discount rates is, somewhat surprisingly, much higher for fair division
games compared to auctions. As a result there are more occurrences of the winner’s curse in
the fair division games than in the auctions. With the exception of the ﬁrst-price rule with
inexperienced bidders where the fair division game shows (insigniﬁcantly) less occurrences
of the winner’s curse than the corresponding auction, fair division games have signiﬁcantly
more occurrences of the winner’s curse.8 Thus, we accept Hypothesis 1 in three out of the
four situations considered.
Result 1 Except for inexperienced bidders under the ﬁrst-price rule, the fair division game
always leads to more occurrences of the winner’s curse than the corresponding auction.
Consistent with Eyster and Rabin (2005) we ﬁnd that the degree of cursedness is typi-
cally smaller for experienced bidders. The only exception is the ﬁrst-price fair division
game where the estimated  is roughly 1.4 for experienced bidders compared to 0.86 for
inexperienced bidders.
Figure 2 shows the development of the shading rates (averaged over the matching groups)
graphically. The upper horizontal line in each of the four graphs indicates the shading rate
implied by the SRNNE bidding strategy. The lower horizontal line displays the shading
rate implied by the break even bid, i.e., the shading rate that leads to an expected proﬁt
margin of zero. Figure 2 suggests that bidding behavior in auctions converges to the region
around the break even shading rate, whereas behavior in the fair division games is more
dispersed and does not converge. Table 5 presents the results from a mixed eﬀects model,
taking into account ﬁxed eﬀects on the treatment variables and their interactions, as well
as random eﬀects on the individual level. The endogenous variables in these regressions
are the shading rate (column 1 and 2) and the proﬁt margin (column 3 and 4). For each
endogenous variable there are two regressions: one for the fair division games and one for
8The p-values of a Mann-Whitney U-test are 0.036 for second-price rule and experienced bidders, 0.016
for second-price rule with inexperienced bidders and 0.019 for the ﬁrst-price rule with experienced bidders.
15
Jena Economic Research Papers 2009 - 090Figure 2: Mean shading rates over time (matching group level)
Note:  - inexperienced players, M - experienced players, ’-’ equilibrium behavior, ’-’ break even
strategy
16
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Data Fair Division Auction Fair Division Auction
Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
(Intercept) 0.9431*** 0.3096*** -6.5694*** -6.4743***
2nd-price -0.9439*** -0.1423 1.5371 6.1368***
period -0.0140 0.0200*** 0.3222** 0.3314***
experience -0.6866*** 0.2366** -3.0961* -1.3988
2nd-price:period 0.0112 -0.0213*** -0.2800 -0.4053***
2nd-price:experience 0.8153** -0.1693 4.8157 -0.5083
period:experience 0.0293** -0.0119*
2nd-price:period:experience -0.0305* 0.0055
obs 1565 1869 385 452
*** p < 0:001 ** p < 0:01 * p < 0:05
Table 5: Within games comparison of shading rates and winner proﬁt margins (mixed
eﬀects model with random eﬀects on the individual level)
the auctions. The number of periods played has a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on shading
rates in auctions but not in fair division games. This, however, is only true for ﬁrst-
price auctions; for second-price auctions this eﬀect is canceled out by the negative and
signiﬁcant coeﬃcient of the interaction term of the dummy for the second-price rule and
the number of periods. For the fair division game time only increases shading rates for
experienced subjects. But again, the signiﬁcant positive eﬀect holds only for the ﬁrst-price
rule. While the eﬀect of experience on shading rates is signiﬁcantly positive in auctions,
the eﬀect is signiﬁcantly negative in the ﬁrst-price fair division game and slightly positive
for the second-price fair division game. The winners’ proﬁt margins increase over time for
the ﬁrst-price rule in both games; but especially for the auction this is not true for the
second-price rule.
Result 2 Time and experience have a positive eﬀect on shading rates and proﬁt margins
for auctions under the ﬁrst-price rule. For the fair division game under the ﬁrst-price rule
only time has a positive eﬀect, while the eﬀect of experience is even negative. There are no
signiﬁcant eﬀects under second-price rule for both games.
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*** p < 0:001 ** p < 0:01 * p < 0:05
Table 6: Within rule comparison of shading rates and winner proﬁts (mixed eﬀects model
with random eﬀects on the individual level)
The inﬂuence of time under ﬁrst-price rule suggests that some learning is going on, but it
naturally seems to decrease after about half of the periods (see ﬁgure 2). We will for our
next analysis only consider the last ten rounds, assuming that most of the learning has
taken place in the ﬁrst ten rounds. We look at how the shading rates diﬀer between the two
games after learning. Indeed, the eﬀect of ’period’ becomes insigniﬁcant when considering
only the last ten rounds. We have therefore regressed the shading rate on ’experience’
and the game type, plus their interaction. Table 6 provides the results of two regressions
(which are again mixed eﬀects models with random eﬀects on the individual level), one
for the ﬁrst-price rule and one for the second-price rule. They suggest that the discount
is higher for the auctions under ﬁrst-price rule, but only for experienced subjects. The
contrary is true for the second-price rule, where experienced subjects show lower shading
rates in the auctions than in the fair division games. Therefore, we have to reject our third
hypotheses, except for experienced subjects under ﬁrst-price rule.
Result 3 Shading rates are lower in the fair division games than in the auctions under
ﬁrst-price rule only for experienced subjects. Under second-price rule shading rates are for
experienced subjects higher in the fair division games than for the auctions. There is no
diﬀerence in shading rates between the games for inexperienced subjects.
In order to test for our last hypothesis, we calculated the number of excess wins for each
subject. Figure 3 shows the histograms of the participants’ number of excess wins for all
18



















































































































Figure 3: Histograms of excess wins per subject
(] excess wins =] actual wins - ] highest signal)
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Fair division 3.410 3.485 2.749 2.851
Auction 2.136 2.064 2.885 3.005
p-valuea 0.055 0.007 0.956 0.916
Table 7: Standard deviations of the number of excess wins
Note: ap-values corresponding to a Brown-Forsythe test for equality of variances
four games and divided by whether they had gained experience under a diﬀerent price rule
before or not. This statistic is by construction centered around zero, since in equilibrium
the number of excess wins per subjects should be zero. There are, however, diﬀerences in
the dispersion of the frequency distributions for the diﬀerent games, especially for the ﬁrst-
price rule. The number of excess wins varies between -6 and 10 for inexperienced subjects
in the ﬁrst-price fair division game, whereas for the ﬁrst-price auction all but four of the
(inexperienced) subjects lie between -3 and 3. For experienced subjects this diﬀerence in
dispersion seems to be even more pronounced. Table 6 conﬁrms this observation. The
standard deviation of excess wins is signiﬁcantly greater for the ﬁrst-price fair division
game compared to the ﬁrst-price auction. For the second-price rule standard deviations
are very similar across the games and there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences. Thus, we have
our last result:
Result 4 The distribution of the number of excess wins is more dispersed in fair division
games for the ﬁrst-price rule but not for the second-price rule.
6 Discussion and conclusions
Before we discuss our results and their implications we summarize our main ﬁndings. First,
we observe more occurrences of the winner’s curse in fair division games than in auctions.
Note, however, that the winner’s curse does not necessarily lead to negative proﬁts in fair
division games since bidders start with an initial endowment, namely the n th share of
the object. Second, there is little improvement in bidding behavior over time in the fair
division game (except for experienced subjects under the ﬁrst-price rule). Experience with
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game. Shading rates do not diﬀer systematically between the games. Finally, we ﬁnd
evidence that bidders in the ﬁrst-price fair division game are more dispersed in terms of
how often they have won the object than in auctions.
One might be tempted to explain diﬀerences between auctions and fair division games
with social considerations. In the fair division game the money that the winner overpays
is not given to the experimenter but shared among the other bidders. If the experimental
subjects harbor reservations towards the experimenter or are altruistic with respect to their
fellow participants they might bid less cautious which results in more occurrences of the
winner’s curse. We do not think that this is a likely explanation since the experimental
auction literature typically ﬁnds that participants bid quite aggressively which even led
to the introduction of the spite motive to explain overbidding in private value auctions
(Morgan, Steiglitz, and Reis, 2003). The framing of our fair division treatment is neutral
and as close as possible to the auction situation and therefore we do not expect a sudden
emergence of altruistic feelings.
The fact that experience has a negative eﬀect on shading rates in the ﬁrst-price fair division
game and a positive eﬀect in the second-price fair division game might be explained with
a sluggish adjustment to the new price rule. The equilibrium shading rate is greater under
the ﬁrst-price rule than under the second-price rule. If subjects keep playing according to
the old price rule for the ﬁrst couple of periods in which the new price rule is in place and
then slowly adjust their bidding, we would get the observed pattern: a positive eﬀect going
from the ﬁrst- to the second price rule and negative eﬀect when going from the second- to
the ﬁrst-price rule. For the auction, however, we do not observe such a slow adjustment.
Our last result about the frequency of the number of excess wins highlights that in fair
division games some bidders exploit the excessive bidding of other bidders and thereby
proﬁt from the winner’s curse. Notice that this is only true for the ﬁrst-price rule. In the
second-price fair division game two cursed players are necessary to push the price above
the value of the object. If three players remain passive and attempt to exploit the winner,
the winner pays only a rather low price. Moreover, by placing a high bid it is even possible
for a bidder to increase the price she receives for her share. This strategy of inﬂuencing
the price one receives, however, entails the risk of winning the object.
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object and how other parties involved should be compensated, one can ask whether they are
an appropriate mechanism to solve such a conﬂict. The results of this experiment suggest
that fair division games are not an appropriate mechanism in a common value environment.
Although the winner’s curse might not lead to a negative payoﬀ for the winner, her payoﬀ
will be lower than the expected value of her initial share of the object. Anticipating this,
bidders might veto the mechanism. But even if all conﬂict parties participate, they might
–in expectation of excessive bidding by some parties– place very low bids that do not reﬂect
their signals very well. Consequently, the price will not be an unbiased estimator of the
common value and the fair division game will not eﬃciently aggregate the privately owned
signals.
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A Derivation of SRNN and -cursed equilibrium bidding strate-
gies
We use the framework introduced by Milgrom and Weber (1982) and extended by Eyster
and Rabin (2005) to incorporate -cursed equilibria to ﬁnd the equilibrium bidding strate-
gies for all games and price rules.
An indivisible object is auctioned oﬀ to n  3 risk neutral bidders.9 The vector (x1;:::;xn) 2
[x;x]n  Rn is a proﬁle of private signals held by the individual bidders and v 2 R is an
additional possibly payoﬀ relevant random variable with density h(v): We assume that for
every i, g(xijv) satisﬁes the monotone-likelihood property. In our common value environ-
ment the signals held by diﬀerent bidders are uncorrelated given v : Thus, the joint density
of x1;:::;xn;v is f(x1;:::;xn;v) =
Qn
i=1 g(xijv)h(v): The value of the object to a bidder
is u(x1;:::;xn;v) which is continuous and increasing in the signals xi and v. We further
assume that bidders are symmetric, i.e., u(x1;:::;xn;v) is symmetric in the private signals
xi :
Let Y i and Z i be the highest and second-highest signals among all bidders except i:
Following Milgrom and Weber (1982) we deﬁne the following two functions: r(xi) =
E[u(x1;:::;xn;v)jxi] is the expectation of the object’s value given the private signal xi
and (xi;y) = E[u(x1;:::;xn;v)jxi;Y i = y] is the expectation of the object’s value given
the private signal xi and given that the highest signal of the other bidders is y :
A.1 First-price auction
In the ﬁrst-price auction the bidder with the highest bid wins the auction. She receives the
object and pays the amount of her own bid. Milgrom and Weber (1982) show that bidder
9For the ﬁrst- and second-price auction and the ﬁrst-price fair division game the minimum number of
bidders is 2. For our presentation of the second-price fair division game we require that n  3:
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((x;y)   b)fY (yjx)dy (7)
for every x; where fY (yjx) is the density of the highest bid of the other bidders given that
bidder i observes x:
Eyster and Rabin (2002, 2005) extend this framework to allow for cursed bidders, i.e.,
bidders that fail to fully understand the relationship between the strategies of other bidders
and their private signals and thus the value of the object. A -cursed equilibrium for this





((1   )(x;y) + r(x)   b)fY (yjx)dy : (8)
For  = 0 this expression is the same as the approach by Milgrom and Weber (1982).
However, for  > 0 bidders underestimate the informational consequences that the event of
winning the auction contains about the common value of the object. Since the traditional,
uncursed equilibrium is part of in the -cursed equilibrium we will in the following only
solve for the -cursed equilibrium.
The solution to problem (8) is the diﬀerential equation
b0




together with the boundary condition b(x) = (1   )(x;x) + r(x):
For our setting, where u(x1;:::;xn;v) = v;v  U[v;v] and xi  U[v   ;v + ] we have the
following expressions for r(x);(x;x) and fY (yjx) :

















Following much of the experimental literature we focus our analysis on the interior region,
i.e., where x 2 [v + ;v   ]:
10Since all equilibria we discuss in the following are symmetric we drop the index i:
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n(x   v   )
2
) (10)
for x 2 [v + ;v   ]:
A.2 Second-price auction
In the second-price auction the bidder with the highest bid wins and pays the bid of the





((1   )(x;y) + r(x)   b(y))fY (yjx)dy ; (11)
for every x: This leads to the general bidding function
b(x) = ((1   )(x;x) + r(x) (12)
and for our particular choices of densities v  U[v;v] and xi  U[v   ;v + ] we obtain




for x 2 [v + ;v   ]:
A.3 First-price fair division game
In the ﬁrst-price fair division game the bidder with the highest bid wins and pays her
own bid. In contrast to the auction, however, she does not pay the price to an auctioneer
but to all bidders, including herself, in equal parts. Therefore, a bidder receives some
positive payoﬀ even if she is not the highest bidder. A -cursed bidder with private signal
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b(x) =
8
> > > > <




n(n2+n 1) + C1 (x +    v)
(  n2
n 1) for x 2 [v   ;v + ];
x    + 2
n2 + n 2
n + C2 exp(  n2x
2(n 1)) for x 2 [v + ;v   ];
no analytical solution for x 2 [v   ;v + ]:
(16)
Since we require b to be continuous everywhere on [v  ;v +] the constant C1 has to be
zero. Equating the ﬁrst and second line in equation (16) at x = v+ we can determine C2
and get









2(n 1)(x   v   )) in the region of
x 2 [v + ;v   ]:
A.4 Second-price fair division game
In the second-price fair division game the highest bidder receives the object and has to
pay the second-highest bid to all bidders in equal parts. A bidder who does not win the
object might therefore receive one nth of her own bid, if she is the second-highest bidder
or she receives one nth of the second-highest bid of the other n   1 bidders, if her bid is


























where fY;Z(y;zjx) is the joint density of the highest and second-highest signal of the other
n 1 bidders given that bidder i observes x: The solution to problem (18) is the diﬀerential
equation
b0




The boundary condition that we used for the ﬁrst-price auction, b(x) = (1   )(x;x) +
r(x); is not applicable for the second-price fair division game. Since equilibrium bidding
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has the lowest bid and can increase her expected payoﬀ by raising her bid slightly above
(1   )(x;x) + r(x): By doing this she will still not win the object but she increases
the probability of being the second-highest bidder and, thus, increase her payment in case
of losing. Instead, we use the condition b(x) = (1   )(x;x) + r(x): A bidder with
the highest possible signal knows that she is the highest bidder. Increasing her bid further
does not change her expected payoﬀ and reducing her bid increases the probability of not
winning the object and receiving a smaller payment.11
Solving the diﬀerential equation in equation (19) for our setting yields









for x 2 [v+;v ]:12 Unfortunately, there is again no analytical solution for the region of
x 2 [v   ;v + ] and we cannot apply the boundary condition b(v + ) = v to determine
the constant C3 for the more general case. From the numerical solution for the speciﬁc
values  = 0;n = 4; = 15 and v = 150 we obtain C3 =  8:070  10 34 : Plotting the
bidding function in equation (20) with these parameters on the range x 2 [65;135] gives
an almost straight line, which suggest that the exponential term is negligible.
The -cursed equilibrium strategies of these four games for our parameter values, v =
50:v = 150; = 15 and n = 4 in the region x 2 [65;135] are summarized in Table 8.
11For our speciﬁc example we obtain that a bidder with the lowest possible signal v   ; and who
therefore knows that v = v ; bids v in the ﬁrst-price fair division game and above v in the second-price fair
division game. Conversely, a bidder with the highest possible signal v +  knows that v = v and bids v
in the second-price fair division game and below v in the ﬁrst-price fair division game. This parallels the
result in Güth and van Damme (1986) that the ﬁrst-price rule guarantees overbidding proofness and the
second-price rule guarantees underbidding proofness in fair division games in a private value environment.
12Here, we used the additional result that FY;Z(y;xjx) =
2 (2)n (x y+2)n
(2)n n for y  x:
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ﬁrst-price b(x) = x   15 + 15
2 + 1 ; b(x) = x   105
8 + 15
2 + 2 ;
1 = 6(1   3
4)exp(  2




second-price b(x) = x   15
2 + 15
2 b(x) = x   45
8 + 15
2 + 3 ;
3 = C()exp( 8
15x)
Table 8: Summary table of -cursed equilibrium strategies for the values v  U[50;150]
and xi  U[v   15;v + 15] and n = 4 for the region x 2 [65;135]: Note that there is no
analytical solution for the constant C():
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